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SUl\fMARY 
This study has three major objectives: (1) to 
derive production functions for farms operated under 
different leasing and tenure arrangements, (2) to 
compare the marginal productivity of resources used 
under these various situations, (3) to explore the 
use of computed marginal productivities as a basis 
of allocating income shares to tenant and landlord. 
The data which serve as the basis of the study are 
from sample surveys in the Tama-Muscatine soil area 
of east-central Iowa, the Clarion-Webster soil area 
of northern Iowa and the Shelby-Grundy-Haig (and 
associated soils) in southern Iowa. Produetion func-
tions for crops in these areas are as follows, where Y 
is the annual value of crop prodliction, Xl is labor 
measured in months, X 2 is cropland measured in acres 
and X3 is the value of all capital services used on 
crops: 
1950 sample in Tama-.ill1tscafine soils 
Crop-share leases: 
Y = 4.57X1o.119 
Cash leases: 
X 0.773 2 v 0.318 ·l-3 
Y = 9.00X10.005 X20.0G5 X30.305 
1951 sample in northern Iowa 
Crop-share leases: 
Y = 43.26X10.007 
Owner-operated farms: 
Y = 13.00X1 0.085 
All farms: 
X 0.731 
2 
X" 0.»G1 
• 2 
V 0.202 
.A3 
V 0.153 
.l- 3 
Y = 18.75.YtO•07G X 20.0l2 .X30.1G5 
1951 sample in southern Iowa 
Owner-operated farms: 
Y = 6.97Xt o.080 .X20.82.j X 3 0. 342 
All farms: 
Y = 5.22Xt o.088 .X20.795 
Marginal produetivities derived from these :func-
tions differ for various lease types as would be ex-
pected :from theoretical considerations. The marginal 
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productivities are higher for labor and capital under 
crop-share leases than under cash leases in the 1950 
Tama-Muscatine sample. The marginal productivities 
are higher for land under cash leases than under share 
leases. Owner-operated farms have higher marginal 
productivities for land but lower productivities for 
capital and labor than crop-share rented farms. 
Highest productivities are expected for capital and 
labor on farms which apply less of these two resources 
pel' acre of land. Lower labor/land or capital/land 
ratios usually denote application of fewer farm prac-
tices or less of a particular resource such as fertilizer. 
All production elasticities for the individual func-
tions were significant at levels of 1 to 20 pereent. 
However, in testing the differences between marginal 
productivities of (a) share-rented and cash-rented 
farms or (b) share-rented and owner-operated farms, 
only the values for land were significant. Productivi-
ties were significantly greatest on cash-rented farms. 
For all tests of departure of marginal productivities 
from rental payments, the t values were significant 
at 1- to 5-percent probability levels. 
,\Then product shares were compared with the pro-
portion of resource services furnished by tenant and 
landlord under standard share arrangements, the two 
were similar in northern Iowa. The proportion of 
production services furnished. by the tenant was 
54.3 percent, while his share of the product was 53 
percent. The tenant shares were less similar in south-
ern Iowa, where they were 67.7 and 51 percent re-
spectively. It appears doubtful that share arrange-
ments in southern Iowa should parallel so closely 
those of northern Iowa. 'rhe relative value produc-
tivity of resources furnished by landlord and tenant 
in the two areas does not parallel the relative shares 
of the product. 
Computed marginal productivities were tested as 
a method of allocating income between landlord and 
tenant. This method does not appear useful for allo-
cating incomes if the data are based on farm aggre-
gates. However, tenants and landlords still need to 
use marginal analysis in deciding on rental arrange-
ments and rental rat.es or shares. These marginal quan-
tities can be computed by budgeting methods and 
need not be as refined as those computed in this 
methodological study. 
The use of aggregates is limited because of diffi-
culties involved in the magnitude of production elas-
t.icities. Hence, the problem needs further stUdy. 
Marginal Productivity of Resources and Imputation 
of Shares for Cash and Share Rented Farms l 
BY EARL O. HEADY 
The farm operator has alternative means of obtain-
ing control of resourees. These several means, allow 
him to use the services of resources in the production 
process and to acquire income for his own family in 
the process of producing foods and fibers for other 
consumers. The altcrnative means of obtaining con-
trol of resources and use of production services in-
elude; ownership, borrowing of capital, renting 
through eash and share arrangements and exchange 
of services through trading work and machinery with 
his neighbors. 
The method of obtaining control of resources and 
the use of resource services thus become important 
problems in farm management and production eco-
nomics. What method will allow the individual farm 
manager the greatest income from the funds he con-
trols ~ What mcthod allows the most efficient usc of 
resources from the standpoint of the over-all economy Y 
This study is one of a. series dealing with leases in 
relation to farming efficiency; it is directed at answer-
ing these over-all economic questions. 
ROLE OF LEASING FORMS IN PRODUCTION 
EOONOMICS EFFIOIENCY 
The type of farm lease can either aid or retard 
efficiency in farming. Previous studies have shown 
conceptually that either share or cash leases can in-
clude arrangements which cause the farm operator 
to use capital, labor and land resources in a non-
optimum manner.2 These imperfections need not be 
inherent in the lease form. They can stem from the 
lcasing eustoms and institutions which have grown 
up and been perpctuated over time.3 Sharing arrange-
ments, particularly leases, can cause resources to be 
used inefficiently on rented farms. Rental payments 
under share leases represent a variable payment 
within the farm business. Therefore, they affect the 
cost function from which the tenant makes decisions. 
The sharing provisions can cause him to use too few 
resources for onc enterprise or for the farm business 
as a whole. They can cause him to use a combination 
of crop enterprises which is inconsistent with effi-
ciency. They can retard use of effieient practices such 
1 Project 1135. Iowa Agricultural Experiment Station . 
• Heady. Earl O. Economics of leasing systemS. Jour. Farm 
Eeon. 29 :659-678. AUg., 1947. 
Heady; Earl O. Rnd Kehrberg, Earl 'v. Relationship of crop-
share and cash leasing systems to farming efficiency. Iowa Agr. 
Exp. Sta. Res. Bul. 386. 
Heady, Earl O. Economics of agricultural production and 
resource use. Prentice-Hall, Inc., New York. 1952. Ch. 15. 
S Heady, Economics of agricultural production and resource 
use. Ch. 15. 
as fertilization or conservation measures (or, they 
may allow use of a practice such as fertilization, but 
the tcnant may use less than the optimum amount), 
Oertain rules of production economics can be estab-
lished for share leases. These rules provide the frame-
work for evaluating the empirical or factual findings 
of lease studies. They also provide a framework with-
in which farming efficiency can be as great undcr a 
share lease as under a cash lease or under ownership 
operatorship. The rules, explained in the technical 
terminology of production economics, are as follows;' 
(1) 'l'he at'l'angements /01' shal'ing costs and pro-
d1!ction for each particlllal' crop 11tnst be the same, 
In other words, if the share of the crop is to be 
divided on a 50-50 basis, costs (or, at the minimum, 
the direct variable costs) also must be shared on a 
50-50 basis. For example, suppose the cost of a new 
practice is $3.50 per acre and the return from it is 
$6. Use of this practice will be profitable for the 
operator who owns his farm and gets all the return 
from new methods. However, it will be unprofitable 
for either a tenant or a landlord who pays all the 
cost ($3.50) and gets back only half the return ·($3). 
Still, if the "equal share of costs and returns" prin-
ciple is applied, the cost to either the tenant or land-
lord will be $1.75, and the return will be $3 to each 
under a 50-50 arrangement. The practicc then will 
be equally profitable to both. . 
The condition or rule specified above is to assure 
that the tenant, or the landlord, will invest an opti-
mum amount of capital and other resources in an 
individual enterprise. It also is to assure that the 
proper or economic amount of materials (such as 
fertilizer) representing each practice for the enter-
prise will be used. 
(2) The shm'es of all competitive Cl'OpS must be the 
same.5 That is, if the rental share is to be 50-50 for 
one crop, it should not be 35-65 for another crop. If 
different sharcs are given for different crops, the 
allocation of labor, materials and other resources 
between cnterprises probably will not be of a pattern 
to give maximum farm profits or to give the consumer 
the maximum of desired products from a given col-
lection of resources. 
For example, suppose the gross return per acre is 
$40 for crop A and that its cost per acre is $16. The 
net of $24 will cause the owner-operator or cash ten-
• All farms must attain certain equilibrium conditions. These 
conditions, as applied In agriculture, are outlined In Heady. 
Earl O. Economics of agricultural production and resource use. 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., New York, 1952. Ch. 4-8. However, the rented 
farm must attain certain additional conditions (ibid., Ch. 17). 
• The Same rule Can be applied to crops Which are comple-
ments or are Independent in a supplementary sense. However, If 
slight (U!viations are made for crops of this nature, the optimum 
enterprise combination Is not likely to be violated. 
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ant to produce this crop rather than B, if B grosses 
only $31 per acre and has costs of $8 per acre. Still, 
the share tenant who pays all of the costs and gives 
half the return for A and 40 percent of the return 
for B as rent will find B more profitable. If the tenant 
gives a rent of half of each crop or any other equal 
proportions for the crops, A also will be more profit-
able for him. . 
(3) The prospects for returns over time, considering 
the normaZ uncM·tainties of weather and the m,arket, 
must be the same 1tnder the lease as they would. be irn 
its absence. This condition can best be guaranteed 
through (a) compensation for unexhausted invest-
ments should the tenant need to move before full re-
turns have been realized from an investment, or (b) 
a lease long enough to guarantee full returns. Under 
many kinds of farming, compensation may be more 
nearly feasible than a lease of sufficient length. How-
ever, it should be based on expected earning power 
of investments rather than unexhausted investment 
alone. Suppose, for example, that a tenant has two 
investment opportunities. Both will return 20 cents 
on the dollar and are equally attractive. However, 
if one requires 3 years to payout and a compensation 
clause is provided to give the tenant back only his 
investment should he move in 2 years, this investment 
will not appear profitable. Why should he invest in 
it with the possibility of getting back only $1 for 
each $1 invested ¥ He will be better off to invest in 
the other opportunity which returns $1.20 for each 
$1 invested within the year. . 
(4) The share of incmne going to each party of the 
lease must represent the pl'od-uct of the reS01~I'CeS 
furnished by this person. In other words, shares whieh 
are not in line with the contributions of leasee and 
lessor are likely to cause the "controlling" party to 
specify inefficient use of resouree. Resources will not 
be used in a manner consistent with demand of con-
sumers, as expressed in market prices, and with the 
production possibilities of the farm. 
OPTIMUM PROGRAMS UNDER FOUR CONDITIONS 
If the conditions outlined above are used, they 
guarantee that the farming program whieh is most 
profitable for the tenant also will be most profitable 
for the landlord. In any case where the most profit-
able program for one party is not also best for the 
other, one of the above optimum eonditions ordi-
narily is being violated. If the lease incorporates the 
four basic conditions outlined above and if it encour-
ages a single farm organization which is optimum 
for both crop-share tenant and landlord, then it also 
allows a farming system which would be optimum 
under owner-operation or a cash lease. 
CASH RENTS 
A cash lease needs only the specifications Hsted 
under condition 3 in respect to time and condition 4 
in respect to marginal products and shares to help 
guarantee efficiency. Condition 2 is automatically at-
tained since the tenant pays all of the marginal costs 
(i.e., all variable costs which determine marginal 
costs) and receives all of the marginal product. (He 
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gives no shares as rent.) Since cash rent is a fixed 
cost, it does not give rise to tenant or landlord shares 
of expenses which are inconsistent with shares of 
crop. Also, since it is a constant cost per acre and 
does not enter into marginal costs, it does not affect 
the operator's decision on crops. With cash rent of 
$5 per acre for the farm mentioned previously, the 
cash tenant will find crop A to be most profitable. 
The main imperfections in the cash lease are those 
growing out of the risks and uncertainties attached 
to the commitment of a large fixed payment in the 
future. The rent remains the same, in contrast to 
share renting, even if crops fail. 
A second characteristic of the cash lease also may 
cause inefficient farming. It is the fact that the ten-
ant, since he pays a fixed rent with no share of sur-
plus returns going to the landlord, may try to exploit 
the .farm as greatly as possible before he moves. He 
alone benefits from any surplus returns which may 
be drawn from the land. 
Both cash and share leases have their respective 
advantages and disadvantages in promoting or re-
tarding efficient farm management. The conditions 
or principles outlined above can help guarantee that 
leases promote efficient farming. However, it is sup-
posed that a large number of leases, both cash and 
share, do not include the basic production economic 
conditions specified above.a Hence, to what extent 
does inefficient farming result due to imperfect 
leasing arrangements? How do the two leases affect 
resource productivities? 
OBJECTIVES AND DATA 
The purpose of this study is to explore some of 
the basic productivity or efficiency conditions of 
leases on Iowa farms. A previous study dealt with 
the effect of share and cash leases on the adoption of 
efficient farm practices.7 This study deals more speci-
fically with the marginal return of resources used 
under these two major leasing arrangements. 
To the extent that the conditions specified previ-
ously are violated under one lease and not the other, 
the marginal returns of resources might be expected 
to differ under the two systems because tenants: (1) 
use different quantities of resources, (2) use resources 
for different enterprise eombinations or (3) combine 
resources in different proportions. Also, the returns 
to tenant and landlord might be expected to differ 
from the marginal products of the resources furnished 
by each. Thus the specific objectives of this study 
are: (1) to predict marginal resource productivities 
under different tenure arrangements, (2) to compare 
marginal resource productivities under share and cash 
leases and (3) to compare the share of farm returns 
for landlords and tenants with (a) the marginal 
• See Hurlburt, Virgil L. Farm rental practices and problems 
in the Midwest. North Central Regional Publication No. 50 
(Iowa Agr. Exp. Sta. Res. Bul. 416) for empirical indications of 
numbers of farms which do not attain the conditions listed. 
• See Heady, Earl O. and Kehrbcrg, Earl W. Relationship 
of crop-share and cash leasing systems to farming efficiencY. 
Iowa Agr. Exp. Sta. Res. Bul. 386. 
This study also suggests the extent to which leasing prae-
tlces follow the basic production economics principles outlined 
above. 
products of resources furnished by each and (b) the 
share of income computed by alternative methods. 
The study is a fundamental one dealing with the 
application of a basic production economics method 
to a particular farm management problem. Predic-
tion of marginal resource productivities for alter-
native types of leases has not been attempted pre-
viously. The following point needs emphasis in inter-
pretation of the analysis: Cash and share leases each 
have certain advantages over one another. However, 
the imperfections contained in each may cause re-
source productivities to be similar if the samples for 
each type of lease include farms with both the posi-
tive and negative characteristics of eaeh lease. 
SOURCE OF DATA 
The data upon which this analysis is based come 
from two basic samples. The first basic sample, taken 
in 1950 to include the 1949 production year, included 
a Tama-Muscatine soil area in east-central Iowa. Two 
random samples of 70 farms each were drawn from 
lists of crop-share and cash-rented farms. 
A list of all rented farms was prepared from infor-
mation in county PMA and county treasurers' of-
fices. This list was then shown to each township Pl\iA 
chairman who specified, for his township, farms 
which were rented under crop-share or cash leases. 
Each farm in these two categories was assigned a 
number. Sample units, represented by individual 
farms, were then selected by means of random num-
bers. 
The second basic sample, taken in 1951 to repre-
sent the 1950 production year, was drawn for northern 
and southern Iowa. This sample, drawn on a random 
area basis, was selected to provide inferences for all 
farms over 30 acres in size in the two areas of the 
state. The sample was drawn to include 150 farms in 
each region.s Rented farms were then segregated 
from owned farms for certain productivity estimates 
which follow. In some cases, alternative leasing condi-
tions, as they are typically found on farms, have been 
tested against productivity coefficients derived for 
the entire 1951 sample of farms, without respect to 
tenure. 
DERIVATION OF BASIC PRODUCTION 
FUNCTIONS 
The first empirical step in this study is the deriva-
tion of production functions from which marginal 
resource returns can be computed. The marginal 
products providc the basic statistics for later effi-
ciency comparisons and for gauging the extent to 
which tenant or landlord returns are in line with 
the productivities of their resources. The production 
functions derived in this study are for crops only. 
In obtaining the original questionnaires, use of 
resources was separated for crops and livestock, and 
only crop activities are analyzed in this study. This 
procedure was followed since crop-share arrange-
• The 1950·samples also did not Include any farms under 30 
acres In size. 
ments mainly affect crop decisions. Livestock decisions 
are not affected by the crop-sharing arrangement, 
though they may be affected by the building decisions 
the landlord makes. 
The samples used in this study provide soil areas 
which are relatively homogeneous for the derivation 
of production functions. Additional sample data were 
available to which the current method might be ap-
plied. Howcver, the number of farms included in 
these samples for anyone soil area was small. To 
combine several soil areas would likely have given 
"mongrel" production functions which have little 
meaning.o Hence, analyses were completed for only 
the geographic areas mentioned. It is believed that 
the current samples are drawn from areas which are 
homogeneous enough to provide relatively uniform 
basic production functions. 
CROP PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS FROM 1950 SAMPLES 
Crop production functions were predicted for both 
the crop-share and cash samples taken in 1950. The 
production function used is of the Cobb-Douglas, 
least-squares type. The variables included, identical 
for both types of leases, were: 
Y is the value of crop production, measured in dollars, 
during the 1949 production year. It includes the value of 
all crops produced, including hay and pasture, regardless 
of whether the crops were fed, sold, stored or used other-
wise. 
X1 is the amount of labor used on crops during the same 
year, measured in months. 
X. is the amount of land, measured in acres. 
X. is the amount of capital services used on crops and is 
measured in dollars. It represents the annual inputs of 
capital services for 1949. It does not include capital invest-
ment. Included are the annual expenses for seeds, seed 
treatment, tractor fuel, machinery repairs and deprecia-
tion, fertilizer and all other annual outlays for crops. 
All input categories and the value of crop output 
are for the farm as a whole, rather than for tenant 
or landlord shares. The derived production functions 
are as follows: 
Crop-share: 
Y = 4.57X1 0.119 
Cash leases: 
V' 0.773 ~~2 "t" 0.318 '<'-.3 
Y = 9.00X10.095 X 20.9G5 X 30.305 
The t values are given in table 1 with an indication 
of the probability levels which they represent. All 
regression coefficients are significant at a probability 
level of 10 percent or less. While the labor coefficients 
are significant at a probability level between 5 and 
10 percent, these appear acceptable for use in later 
analysis-especially if the variance of the coefficients 
is remembered. 
CROP PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS FROM 1951 SAMPLES 
Crop production fUllctions of the same algebraic 
form were derived for both the 1951 samples in 
o See Heady. Earl O. Elementary models In farm production 
economics research. Jour. Farm Econ. 30 :201-225. May. 1948. 
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TABLE 1. MEAN INPUTS AND t VALUES FOR REGRES-
SION COEFFICIENTS DERIVED FOR CASH AND 
CROP-SHARE LEASES IN 1950 TAMA-
MUSCATINE SAMPLES. 
Crop-share Cash 
Input item Mean resource inputs 
Labor _______________________ _ 
Land _______________________ _ 
Capital ______________________ _ 
9.0 
195 
1.893 
Value of t for regression coefficients 
Labor _______________________ _ 
Land _______________________ _ 
Capital ______________________ _ 
"p<O.Ol 
to.05>p>0.01 
:l:0.10>p>0.05 
2.20t 
8.67" 
2.12t 
9.4 
187 
1.978 
1.8U 
10.59" 
2.16t 
northern and southern Iowa. The same classification 
of variables was used except that land now includes 
only cropland (including hay) and excludes all per-
manent pasture. Value of crops produced does not 
include permanent pasture. Each of these samples 
was, in turn, broken down into further strata. Farms 
were classified as follows: crop-share lease, cash lease, 
livestock-share lease and owner-operator. (Part own-
ers were not included in these classifications but were 
included for estimates of the all-farm functions.) 
A crop production function estimate was made for 
each one of these groups. However, the samples were 
so small for livestock-share and cash leases (either 
for the obscrvations in northern and southern Iowa 
alone, or for observations in both areas pooled) that 
none of the coefficients proved significant. Accord-
ingly, they werc droppcd from the analysis. The 
crop-share sample for southern Iowa also was so 
small and included such large standard errors that 
it was dropped. Remaining, then, were the production 
functions for crop-share leases in northern Iowa, 
owner-operator farms in northern and southern Iowa 
and all farms (the original sample, including all 
tenure groups) in both areas. The crop production 
functions are listed below for these five classifications 
and relatcd statistics are given in table 2. 
Northern Iowa, crop-share (60 farms) : 
Y = 43.26X10.007 ~Y20.731 .,1'"3°.202 
TABLE 2. MEAN INPUTS AND t VALUES FOR REGRES-
SION COEFFICIENTS DERIVED FOR TENURE 
GROUPS IN 1951 NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN 
IOWA SAMPLES 
Northern 
Iowa Northern Northern 
crop- Iowa Iowa 
sharc owners all farms 
Southern 
Iowa 
owners 
Input 
Item Mean resource Inputs 
Labor (mo.) _ 8.9 
L.and (acres) _ 179 
Capital ($) _ 1.891 
9.9 
152 
2,532 
9.5 
167 
2,168 
9.0 
112 
1.562 
Value of t for regression coefficients 
Labor ______ 1.98:1: 
I.and _______ 7.44" 
Capital _____ 2.15t 
*p<O.Ol 
to.05>l,>0.01 
:l:0.10>p>0.05 
§0.10>p>0.20 
604' 
2.20t 
8.78· 
3.06* 
1.96:1: 
7.30· 
5.24" 
1.79:1: 
2.08t 
1.47§ 
Southern 
Iowa 
all farms 
8.7 
115 
1.420 
3.20" 
5.92* 
2.89* 
Northern Iowa, owner-operator (75 farms) : 
Y = 13.00Xlo.oss X 20.067 XaO.153 
Northern Iowa, all farms (142 farms) : 
Y = 18.75Xl o,076 X 20.912 X SO.165 
Southern Iowa, owner-operator (83 farms) : 
Y = 6.97XlO.OB9 X 20.824 X 3 0.342 
Southern Iowa, all farms (143 farms) : 
Y = 5.22XlO.OBB X 0.795 2 X 0.393 3 
MARGINAL' PRODUCTIVITIES 
Marginal productivities are provided in table 3 
for the resource categories and samples mentioned 
earlier.1o All marginal product figures are given in 
value terms. They are dollars return per $1 of capital, 
per acre of land and per month of labor. The term 
"marginal productivity" refers to the amount added 
to total value of product by "adding one more unit 
of the particular resource." The" one unit addition" 
i~ this case refers to addition beyond the mean quan-
tIty of resources given in previous tables.ll A mar-
ginal return figure does not have the same meaning 
as an average return figure. ,.' Average return" refers 
to the return, as a mean, for all units of resources 
used. "Marginal rcturn" refers to the return of only 
the added unit. Average rcturn is always greater than 
marginal return when marginal returns are diminish-
ing as is the case of all the individual figures pre-
sented. Also, the marginal return of all previous units 
of resources is higher than the one shown under this 
dimin!shiI~g-rcturns situation (i.e., the marginal re-
turn IS hIgher for each resource unit less than the 
mean than it is for the mean productivities shown in 
table 3). 
Tl~e differCJ;ces !n the marginal productivity figures 
are m the dIrectIOn expected, gIven certain known 
imperfections in lease forms and the resource ratios 
found on the farms. Comparing crop-share and cash 
leases from the 1950 Tama-Muscatine sample the 
former has higher marginal products for labo~ and 
1. The standard errors of the regression coefficients in both 
samples are those listed below: 
Standard error 
Sample Labor Land Capital 
1950 Tama-Muscatlne samples Share lease _______ _ 
Cash lease ________ _ 
1951 Northern Iowa samples Share lease _______ _ 
Owners ___________ _ 
All farms _________ _ 
1951 Southern Iowa samples 
0.0540 
0.0503 
0.0490 
0.0386 
0.0388 
Owners ____________ 0.0501 
All farms __________ 0.0269 
0.0891 
0.0911 
0.0981 
0.1101 
0.1250 
0.3956 
0.1343 
0.1502 
0.1412 
0.0939 
0.0500 
0.0313 
0.2303 
0.1360 
11 The marginal products dY/dX have been computed as fol-
lows. where X" X,. and if. refer to the geometric mean input of 
labor, land and capital; k refers to the constant of the equation; 
a~d b" b. and b. refer to the elasticity coefficients associated 
WIth the three resource categories: 
dY _ 
- = b k X bl-l X2b• X3b •• dX1 1 1 
TABLE 3. MEAN RESOURCE PRODUCTIVITIES AND MEAN VALUE OF CROP PRODUCT FOR 1950 AND 1951 SAMPLES. 
Sample 
Labor 
$/mo. 
1950 Tama-l\Iuscatine sample: 
Crop share _________________________ 93.96 
Cash _________________ ______________ 71.27 
1951 northern Iowa sample: 
Crop share __________________________ 92.98 
Owners _____________________________ 68.60 
All farms ___________________________ 68.04 
1951 southern Iowa sam£le: 
Owners _____________________________ 54.80 
All farms ___________________________ 48.05 
capital but a lower figure for land. To the extent that 
costs and production are not shared in the same pro-
portions, less labor and capital are applied on each 
acre of land.12 The lower the labor/land or capital! 
land ratios, the larger are the marginal product 
figures for labor and capital. Similarly, the marginal 
productivity of land will be low if the labor/land and 
capital/land ratios are small and diminishing retur.ns 
hold true. (Diminishing returns arc denoted by elas-
ticities or exponents which are less than 1 in the 
equations shown previously.) 
It has been shown in a previous study that these 
labor/land and capital/land ratios are smaller for 
crop-share than for cash leasesY However, the appli-
cation of less capital and labor per acre may not 
result alone from share arrangements. It also may 
result from a greater number of persons who are 
related in the cash leasing sample. A lease between 
two related persons often results in more certainty 
for a longer planning period and, hence, in the invest-
ment of more capital. The higher labor/land and 
capital/land ratios under the cash lease may also re-
sult from a more favorable capital position of cash 
tenants. The more favorable capital position may 
result from the relatively low cash rental rates in the 
period prior to the study. Cash rates which wcre much 
lower than share rates for 10 to 15 years would allow 
cash tenants to accumulate capital more easily than 
share tenants. -
Comparison of thc crop-share and owner sample 
from the 1951 northern Iowa samples shows exactly 
the same pattern of marginal productivities. In table 
3, the figures for labor and capital are higher and 
the figure for land is lower on the share-rented farms 
than on the owner-operated farms. Again, these dif-
ferences are expected to the extent that imperfections 
in share leases cause the tenant to use lower labor/ 
land and capital/land ratios than the owner. 
As the figures in table 2 show, the labor/land ratio 
is 8.9/179, or 0.05 on share-rented farms and 9.9/152, 
or 0.07 on owner farms. The capital/labor ratio is 
1,891/179, or 10.56 on share-rented farms and 2,532/ 
152, or 16.65 on owner farms. The marginal product 
figures are in line with these ratios. However, the 
marginal product for labor is higher on share-rented 
10 Heady, Earl O. and Kehrberg, Earl ,V. Relationship of 
crop-share and cash leasing systems to farming efficiency. Iowa 
Agr. Exp. Sta. Res. Bul. 386. 
.3 Ibid. 
Land Capital Crop 
$/acre $/$ product 
$ 
28.17 1.18 7,106 
35.89 1.09 7,053 
34.68 0.91 8,493 
50.82 0.48 7,909 
46.83 0.65 8,551 
40.82 1.22 5,550 
33.08 1.32 4,771 
farms in the 1951 northern Iowa sample than on the 
owner farms in the 1951 southern Iowa sample. 
Similarly, capital productivity in the former area is 
lower than in the latter area.14 
SIGNIFICANCE TESTS BETWEEN RENTAL 
l\IETHODS 
As mentioned previously, the productivity differ-
entials pointed out above form a pattern which is 
expected when certain conditions of share-lease forms 
are considered. The differentials are highly uniform 
-in the sense that they give higher or lower marginal 
coefficients where they are expected between share-
rented and cash-rented or owner-operated farms. 
However, it is important to consider sampling var-
iance and to test the significance of these differences. 
The t values for these tests are given in table 4.15 
14 This same finding Is expressed in another study where It 
is explained In some detail. One reason, evidently, why crop 
capital productivity is so low in northern Iowa Is the very large 
Investment In machinery-one component of the capital services 
on crops. On many farms In this area-one about as highly 
mechanized as is found in Corn Belt agriculture-machinery has 
been added to a point wherc marginal returns are very low as 
a convenience to lessen drudgery and increase pleasure of farm 
work as well as for profits. (See Heady, Earl O. and Shaw, 
Russell. Resource returns and productivity coefficients In select-
ed farming areas of Iowa, Montana and Alabama. Iowa Agr. 
Exp. Sta. Res. Bul. 425.) 
.. The t's have been computed as follows. where we wish to 
compare the elasticity for one resource (X) of one sample, 
denoted by the subscript a, with that of another sample, de-
noted by the subscript b. In this equation, b refers to the elas-
ticity coefficient, 8 refers to the standard error, Y refers to the 
mean product. and X refers to the mean input, both considered 
as constants. 
= 
~ 2 + (~b ~a r ( 2 ) Sa Ya Xb Sb 
The term 
Yb Xa 
Va Xb 
is used since it Is necessary to compute the value of b'., the 
regression coefficient which would have given a marginal prod-
uct In sample a. equal to that of Sample b (111.) when the product 
and Input is of the magnitude In sample a. In other words, we 
wish to (letermine b'. to equal 
Ya 
Mb = b'a -::- = marginal product (JlIb) In sample b. 
Xu 
(continued next page) 
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TABLE 4. VALUES OF t FOR TESTING DIFFERENCES IN 
MARGINAL PRODUCTIVITIES OF RESOURCES IN 
DIFFERENT TENURE GROUPS. 
Sample and item tested 
1950 Tama-Muscatine crop function 
Marginal product of labor: share lease vs. 
cash lease 
Marginal product of land: share lease vs. 
cash lease 
Marginal product of capital: share lease vs. 
cash lease 
1951 Northern Iowa crop function 
Marginal product of labor: share lease vs. 
Value of t 
0.42:1: 
1.88t 
0.13t 
owner 0.32:1: 
Marginal product of land: share leuse vs. 
owner 2.25-
Marginal product of capital: share lease vs. 
owner 0.98:1: 
·0.05>p>0.01 
to.l0>1J >O.05 
:1:1,>0.30 
Only the t values for land are significant at a 
probability level ordinarily acceptable for data of 
this nature. The standard errors are large with re-
spect to the relatively small differences in the mean 
marginal products. However, significant differences 
can exist for marginal products computed for other 
resource quantities. Since the different tenure groups 
use different mean quantities of resources (tables 1, 
2 and 3), it is likely that significant differences would 
exist for marginal products computed for equal re-
source quantities.1G The differences between the mar-
ginal products for land are significant, considering 
sampling variance: Cash-leased farms on Tama-
Muscatine soils had a significantly higher marginal 
product, at the mean of the land input, than share-
leased farms. Owner farms in northern Iowa also had 
signifieantly higher returns to land than share-leased 
farms. 
In evaluating the differences between crop-share 
and cash leases and their respective tests, the follow-
ing point should be kept in mind: Each lease has 
characteristics which are different but which encour-
t. (cont'd) 
Since 
Va 
then we have the equality b'a 
Xa 
Therefore b I a 
,. For example, the mean marginal prodUcts can be com-
puted for owner-operators in the 1951 northern Iowa sample. 
supposing them to usc the same quantity of resources for crops 
as the share tenants. The mean input of share tenants In table 2 
Is 179 acres of land, 8.9 months of labor and $1.891 for capital. 
The marginal product of capital on owner farms for the quan-
tities of resources is 0.60. If, using an overly simplified test, we 
compare this marginal product against that of Share-leased 
farms with the same resources, the "computed" b' Is O.OOlS, 
when the actual product and inputs are those of the share-
rented farms (sec footnote 15). 'Vith the square root of the 
sums of the standard errors, we have a t value of 
0.202 - 0.0013 
--;::;:;:~::::;::::;::;;:~ = V (0.049)' + (0.039)" 
0.2007 
0.0623 
a quantity significant at the I-percent level. 
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3.22, 
age or discourage use of resources along the lines of 
the production economics principles outlined earlier. 
Hence, the fact that a resource productivity may 
prove, in a probability sense, to be somewhat similar 
under both does not mean that a particular aspect 
of production is efficient or inefficient under each. 
A share lease, for example, may encourage a more 
efficient use in one department of the :farm business 
and a less efficient use in another department. These 
two facets of resource use may "cancel each other" 
in comparisons between two lease types. The classi-
fication of resources in this study is too broad to allow 
examination of these details of resource use. 
COMPARISON OF RENTAL RATES WITH 
MARGINAL RESOURCE PRODUCTIVITIES 
The amount of rent paid under a lease represents 
the market price of the resource services furnished by 
the lessor. Hence, it is of interest to compare the 
market price or rental rate of these resources with 
their computed marginal products. 
In a. competitive industry such as agriculture, the 
price (i.e" the rental rate in this case) of a resource, 
in the long run, tends to approach the marginal 
productivity of the resource. As is pointed out later, 
some differential is expected because of risk and un-
certainty, and the time aspects of production and 
rental contracts. The comp?rison can be made best 
for land. The landlord does not furnish labor or 
eapital under a cash lease and :furnishes only a small 
amount of capital expense under a share lease, 
The data of table 5 show that the several rental 
rates listed differ significantly from the marginal 
TABLE 5. RENTAL RATES. MARGINAL PRODUCTIVITIES 
FOR LAND, AND t VALUES FOR COMPARISON OF 
RENTAL RATES AND MARGINAL PRO-
DUCTIVITIES OF I,AND. 
Item 
1950 Sample: Tama-Muscatine crop functions 
Average rental per acre for share-rented farms __ _ 
Average rental per acre for cash-rented farms ___ _ 
Marginal product for land per acre on share-rented farms ________________________________________ _ 
Marginal product for land per acre on cash-rented farms _. ______________________________________ _ 
Value of t for average share rent compared to mar-
ginal product of land on share-rented farmst ___ _ 
Value of t for cash rental rate compared to mar-
ginal product of land for cash-rented farmst ___ _ 
1951 Sample: Northern Iowa crop functions 
Value 
$18.90 
10.29 
28.17 
35.89 
7.68· 
12.81· 
Average rental per acre for share-rented farms ___ 20.21 
Average rental per acre for cash-rented farms ____ lS.67 
Marginal product for land per acre on share-rented farms _ .. ______________________________________ 34.68 
Value of t for average share rent compared to mar-
ginal product of land on share-rented farmst ___ 3.1,S. 
Value of t for average cash rent compared to mar-
ginal product of land on share-rented farmst ___ 4.53. 
·p<O.Ol 
tThese value have been computed as 
t = 
8 
,!here b is the elasticity of the land Input, p Is the rental price. 
X is the mean land Input, Y Is the mean product and 8 Is the 
standard error for b. 
product figure for land with which they are com-
pared.17 One criterion of an efficient leasing system 
in a static economy is that rental returns should ap-
proach the marginal product of the rcsource. However. 
there are reasons why differences should and do exist. 
One is the fact that rental coutracts are made in 
advance of the year's production. Income from rc-
sources cannot be predicted with accuracy, particu-
larly where there are large variations in prices and 
yield. Rental rates and marginal products might be 
expected to approach each other only over a period 
of years. Data for 1 or 2 years are not sufficient for 
measuring the tendency. 
A second reason why these two quantities might 
differ is uncertainty. It is generally known that prod-
uct and resource prices arc discounted when uncer-
tainty exists in planning future production. This 
discount is, in the case of a tenant manager, a 
"reward" for the risks which he takes in committing 
resources and expenses with imperfect knowledge of 
future prices and yields and, hence, of income. 
Finally, the rental often includes a return for man-
agement or capital services furnished by the land-
lord. However, addition of a return for these services 
is not great enough to lower the t values in table 5 
to a non-significant level. 
Finally, it should be remembered that the time for 
which the basic data were obtained was one in which 
farmers and other persons were expecting a decline 
in farm prices. Rental rates, particularly cash rates, 
may have been at a level to represent not the price 
level realized at the end of the 1949 and 1950 pro-
duction years but the anticipation of the levels in a 
period as early as 1947 or 1948. When expectations 
and uncertainty are considered, deviations between 
market rental rates and marginal resource product 
perhaps should not be taken to denote economic dis-
equilibrium. 
Further investigation of this phenomenon is needed 
and should include samples in a time when the 
economy is fairly stable or when expectations arc in 
this direction. Additional periods also should be in-
cluded which represent large changes or large ex-
pected changes. The present study provides one 
benchmark for comparison of productivity coeffi-
cients which might be derived from other samples 
in time. 
PROPORTION OF INCOME TO LANDLORD AND 
TENANT COMPARED TO AVERAGE VALUE 
OF RESOURCE SERVICES 
This section of the study compares the share of 
farm income to the landlord and tenant with (1) the 
relative contribtitiou of resource services which each 
furnishes to the total "farm business and (2) the 
relativc marginal productivities of the same resource 
services. It is an exploratory analysis of how farm 
17 The t value used here is a test between the elasticitr or 
regression coefficient derived in the sample and the elastIcity 
value which would have been necessary to g-ive a marginal 
product equal to the partieular rental rate, with the mean re-
source quantity used on the farms. 
rental resources are priced in comparison to their 
average and marginal returns. 
COMPARISON OF ALTERNATING PRINCIPLES IN 
IMPUTING SHARES 
The theory of competitive and static economy 
assumes that the prices of resources (i.e., the rental 
shares to tenant and landlord) should equal or ap-
proach their marginal products. In other words, the 
total return to landlord and tenant should be the 
sum of the marginal products of the individual re-
sources furnished by each. This condition provides 
a basis for allocating resources for production in a 
manner consistent with the greatest long-run return 
to the farm and the desires of consumers. (It is not 
a condition stating how income should be distributed 
to tenant and landlord if consumer welfare for their 
two households is to be maximized.) 
If total income of the farm were allocated to land-
lord and tenant on the basis of marginul resource 
productivity, the share of each would be determined 
as follows: multiply the number of units of each 
resource by the marginal productivity of the respec-
tive resource. Farm operators and owners do not have 
detailed information on marginal coefficients; they 
can only estimate productivities in a rough way. 
The productivity figure used ordinarly is an aver-
age product rather than a marginal product. The 
average product of all resources aggregated into a 
simple input category is used by landlords and ten-
ants when they compute the value of the resource 
services contributed by each and divide the year's 
production on the basis of the ratio Xt/X l where Xl 
refers to the value of resource scrvices contributed by 
the tenant and Xl is the value of resource services 
contributed by the landlord. The average product is 
used sincc the total product is, in effect, divided by 
the total input of services. The return to tenant and 
landlord respectively, then is the average return for 
each $1 ~f resource services furnished by each whether 
these resources are labor, capital or land. 
The "average method" of sharing production in 
proportion to the value of resource services gives the 
same result as the marginal method only under two 
condi tions : 
(1) The resources furnished by tenant and land-
lord must be either technical complements or sub-
stitute for each other at a constant rate. Unless one 
or the other of these two conditions holds true, not 
all units of labor, capital and land make the same 
contribution to production. If the two resources are 
technical complements, they must be combined in 
fixed and inflexible quantities, as 2 atoms of hydro-
gen and 1 atom of oxygen in a molecule of water. 
In this case there is no reason for considering them 
apart; they should be aggregated into a single cate-
gory and "be considered as one." 
If they substitute at constant rates, one can replace 
the other, but the contribution of each to production 
is ahvays the same-regardless of the proport.ions in 
which they are combined. If they substitute at 
diminishing rates, however, thc proportion in which 
they are combined makes a great difference in their 
contribution to production. One amount of labor 
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combined with $10,000 does not have the same pro-
ductivity, with output constant at some specified 
level, as another amount of labor combined with 
$3,000. Hence, it should not be valued similarly when 
computing "relative contributions." The first month 
of labor used to replace capital may replace $2,000; 
the second month may replace only $1,200; and the 
third month only $500. Obviously this method cannot 
be applied, under diminishing substitution rates, in 
the same manner to farms which have different ratios 
of resources. 
(2) Constant returns to scale must hold true. Under 
constant returns to scale, the productivity of every 
unit of a resourcc is the same as for any other unit. 
The marginal product is then the same as the aver-
age product. This fact can be illustrated by the two 
simple equalities below. The average product (A) 
per unit of resource is the total product (P) divided 
by the total units of resources (X) as in (1) below: 
P 
A=X (1) 
The marginal product (M) is the elasticity of pro-
duction (e) multiplied by the ratio P / X as in (2) 
below: 
M= P e-X (2) 
Constant returns to scale hold true only when the 
elasticity figure (e) is equal to 1. Hence, under con-
stant returns to scale (e=l), the righthand side of 
equation (2) becomes 1 PIX, 01' simply PIX. 111 is 
then equal to A and the two methods of allocating 
shares to landlord and tenant will give the same re-
sults. Also, the sum of the shares to each will then 
equal the total farm product. 
However, in case e is not equal to 1 (each exponent 
on the -,,1"s in the production function equations of 
previous pages is an e), the "average method" will 
not give the same result as the "marginal method." 
Also, the total farm product will not be equalled by 
the sum of the landlord and tenants "computed 
shares." The elasticities (the exponents) may be less 
than 1 for the individual resources furnished by land-
lord or tenant. Imputing a share to each equal to 
the quantity of the resource by the marginal product 
of the resource, then, will have this effect: The total 
farm product will not be exhausted by the sum of 
the shares to the landlord and tenant. 
This last principle can be illustrated by the simple 
equations below. In (3) we define a situation in 
which the elasticity (e) of production is less «) 
than 1. The elasticity of production (the c or ex-
ponent on the X's in previous equations) is equal to 
the percentage change in resources used. Hence, 
when AP means" change in total farm production," 
P means total farm production, AX means change in 
quantity of resources used and X means total quan-
tity of resources used. Then AP/P is the percentage 
change in production and AX/Xis the percentage 
change in resources. Thus the elasticity coefficient 
can be 
e < 1 (3) 
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e = D.P / D..A 
P X 
D.P / D.X < 1 
P X 
(4) 
(5 ) 
defined as in (3), and equation (3) is the equivalent 
of equation (5). From (5) we are able to derive (6) 
and (7). Equation (7) indicates that if we multiply 
X D.P < 1 (6) 
P D.X 
X D.P < P 
D.X 
(7) 
the quantity of the resource (X) by its marginal 
product (AP / AX), the resulting quantity or product 
will be less than «) the total product (P) because 
the elasticity (5) is less than l. 
If the elasticity figure had been greater than (» 
1, the sum of the shares of the product computed by 
the "marginal product" method would exceed P, 
the total product with an elasticity equal to 1, the 
shares computed by the" marginal product" method 
will just equal the total product; the "marginal 
product" method also will give the same results as 
the" average product" method. 
The elasticities (or e values) derived in the samples 
all differ from 1, as indicated by the exponents on 
the X's of the previous production function equa-
tions. Hence, it is known that the two methods of 
imputing. shares will not give the same result. It is 
also known that the total product will 110t be exhaust-
ed if tenant and landlord shares are computed on the 
basis of the "marginal product" method. Accord-
ingly, the following procedures are used in the 
empirical analysis which follows: 
Pirst, the dollar value of all inputs or resource ser-
vices furnished by landlord and tenant has been 
computed. These values have been added and the 
two ratios Xt/Sa and Ll/Sa have been computed, 
where Sa is the sum of the dollar value of all resource 
services for the total farm, X t is the value of resource 
services fUl'l1ished by the tenant and Xl is the value 
of resource services furnished by the landlord. The 
total product, in dollar quantities, of the farm (P) 
has then been broken down into the two ratios above.1B 
The resulting absolute shares are then comparcd with 
the income which landlord and tenant actually re-
ceived under share and cash lcasing arrangements. 
This step is an analysis of the outcome under the 
"average method" of impnting shares. 
Second, the quantities of the resonrce services, 
furnished separately by tenant and landlord, have 
been multiplied by their mean marginal products. 
The sum of the quantities arc then determined for the 
farm as a whole and denoted as Sm. The" computed 
share" of P for the tenant then is 
(t:.Pj t:. X t) (XI) 
~--s;;---
18 The tenant's "compute<l share" of P is thus (P) (Xt/S.). 
The "computed share" of the landlord is (P) (XI/S.) for this 
"average product" method. 
while the computed share to the landlord is 
(flP! flX I) (Xl) 
8 m 
This method is used later as a "modified marginal 
product" method of imputing shares to landlord and 
tenant.19 
DATA USED 
The data used in the analysis which follows are 
for all farms in the 1951 northern and southern 
Iowa samples. While not all of the farms included 
in these samples are rented, the objective of this 
section is to test imputed shares for alternative leas-
ing arrangements. These arrangements can be tested 
against the product of any farm which might be 
rented under alternative leases. Hence, the procedure 
is to take all farms in the sample and compute the 
share which would go to the leasing parties if the 
farm were rented under one of the standard leasing 
arrangements. 
The procedure used in testing shares on all sample 
farms, whether owned or rented, gives results which 
are almost identical for share-rented farms in north-
ern Iowa. (The analysis was not made for southern 
Iowa since the standard errors for the elasticity 
coefficients were relatively great, and several of the 
regressions were not significant at the 30-percent 
level of probability.) Hence, only the analysis for all 
sample farms is used (a) to avoid presentation of two 
sets of results which are almost identieal and (b) 
because the elasticity coefficients arc significant at 
low probability levels. The leasing arrangements used 
in the following analysis are those found to exist in 
samples of rented farms. 
A second reason why all farms are used is that the 
static economic tenet stating that shares should equal 
the marginal product of resources refers to the mar-
ginal productivity of resources for all farms-not 
just to rented farms. In other words, the marginal 
return of a particular resource may be high or low 
on one rented farm; yet it may be the marginal pro-
ductivity coefficient on farms far removed from the 
particular farm which has the "final effect in deter-
mining shares which are related to marginal prod-
ucts. " For this reason, comparison of marginal pro-
ductivities on "all farms" with rental shares is more 
meaningful than comparison of only marginal prod-
ucts for rented farms. Even then the "universe ex-
amined" may be too restricted to illustrate propcrly 
any" central tendencies." 
PROPORTIONS IN ''lI-IICH PRODUCTION AND 
RESOURCE SERVICES ARE SHARED 
ON CROPS 
Table 6 shows, for the 1951 samples in northern 
and southern Iowa, the proportions by which crop-
share tenants and landlords shared production and 
,. The totai product, P, is divided Into these two proportions, 
In a manner similar to that outlined for the "average product" 
method In footnote 18. 
values of resource inputs on crops. Expenses have 
been computed by adding (1) the actual cash ex-
penses, including depreciation, plus (2) the market 
value of the services furnished by each party. The 
value of labor was computed by multiplying the 
months of labor used on crops by the monthly wage 
rate without board. The value of land and buildings 
was computed by multiplying the capital value of 
these two classes of assets by the long-term interest 
rate.20 The figures on expenses or values of resource 
services thus represent the annual inputs or contri-
butions to farm production. The figures are based on 
a sample of 60 farms in northern Iowa and 54 farms 
in southern Iowa. 
The modal shares of crops paid as rent to landlords 
are identical in the two samples; mean shares are 
similar. The shares of the annual inputs or expense 
of resources are also highly similar. The only dif-
ference between the two areas is the proportion of 
cash inputs (X3 in the equations on previous pages) 
on crops. This difference results mainly because less 
fertilizer is used on the southern Iowa farms. The 
proportion of all expenses paid by the landlord is 
changed accordingly, since fertilizer is a fairly large 
expense shared by the landlord in northern Iowa. 
.\BSOLUTE VAI.UE OF RESOURCE SERVICES AND INCOME 
}"OR TENAN'l' AND LANDLORD ON CROPS 
Table 7 has been computed for all farms in the 
1951 sample, regardless of whether they were owned 
or rented. The figurcs in this table have been com-
puted by multiplying the mean shares for share-
rented farms (table 6) by the production and ex-
penses (values of resource services) of aU farms in 
the samples. The results indicate the proportions of 
inputs and outputs which would be rcpresented by 
tenant and landlord if all farms in the sample were 
•• The monthly wage rate. computed as a mean for the year, 
WaS $191.10. The interest rate used was 5 percent. 
TABLE 6. MEAN AND MODAL SHARES OF PRODUCT AND 
EXPENSES RECEIVED OR PAID BY THE LANDLORD. 
1951 NORTHERN. SOUTHERN IOWA SAMPLES 
FOR CROP-SHARE LEASES. 
Northern Iowa Southern Iowa 
Mean Mode 1\Iean Mode 
per- per- per- per-
Item shared cent cent cent cent 
Products: 
Corn 
-------------------
50 50 50 50 
Oats -------------~~---- 43 40 44 40 Soybeans 
---------------
45 50 47 50 
Flax 
--------. ---------- 41 40 0 0 
Hay ---~--------------- ($6.10) 0 ($4.91) 0 
Expenses or values of 
resource services: 
Machinery expenses' 2 0 2 0 
All other cash Inputs on 
crops 
----------------
44 xx 37 xx 
Land 
------------------
100 100 100 100 
Labor 
------------------ t 0 t 0 
Buildings ~------------- 100~ 100 100~ 100 
·Includes custom hire of machinery. This is the main machine 
item shared by the landlord. 
tLess than 1 percent. 
~A few tenants paid some building repairs, but the total for 
the rented sample was less than 1 percent. 
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TABLE 7. MEAN VALUE OF RESOURCE SERVICES AND 
MEAN VAI,UE OF CROP PRODUCTION FOR LAND-
LORD AND TENANT PER FARM, 1951 NORTHERN 
AND SOUTHI~RN IOWA SAMPLES.· 
Item 
Northern Iowa 
Machine expenses ($) 
All other crop capital ex-penses ($) _____________ _ 
Crop, land and buildings ( $ ) Labor ($) ________________ _ 
Total value per farm ($) __ 
Percent of total (%) ______ _ 
Southern Iowa 
Machine expenses ($) 
All other crop capital ex-penses ($) _____________ _ 
Crop, land and buildings ($) Labor ($) ________________ _ 
Total value per farm ($) __ _ 
Percent of total (%) ______ _ 
Value of crop 
Northern Iowa 
Value of crop production ($) 
Percent of total (%) -----~ 
Southern Iowa 
Value of crop production ($) 
Percen t of total (%) ------
Total dollar value for: 
Tenant Landlord 
1,573 
570 
t 
1,815 
3,958 
54.3 
1,044 
238 
t 
1,662 
2,944 
67.7 
production 
4,535 § 
53.0 
2,438§ 
51.0 
25 
253 
3,054 
:1: 
3,332 
45.7 
26 
139 
1,240 
t 
1,405 
32.3 
4,016·' 
47.0 
2,339'· 
49.0 
Farm 
total 
1,598 
823tt 
3,054 
1,815 
7,290 
100 
1,070 
377tt 
1,240 
1,662 
4,349 
100 
8,551 
100 
4,777 
100 
'These' farm totals and shares for landlord and tenant are 
based on all farms in the 1951 northern and southern Iowa 
samples. In other words, the quantities representing means for 
the farms, with regard to tenure, have been broken down Into 
the mean proportions of costs and production found on share-
rented farms In the two areas. The 60 share-rented farms in 
northern Iowa and 44 share-rented farms In southern Iowa pro-
vide the mean shares by which production and inputs for all 
farms are shared. The figures in the table show the contribu-
tions which would be mllde by, and the return which would be 
received if, all farms were rented under the typical crop-share 
lease. 
tFigure not shown because building expense is only Infre-
quently paid by tenant. 
tFigure not shown because labor expense is only Infrequently 
paid by landlord. 
§Includes value of hay, less cash rent paid to landlord for 
these items. 
··Includes only cash rent paid by tenants fa I' hay and not 
value of hay produced. 
ttTaxes are not include,1 since the resources upon which they 
are levied, rather than the tax, represent the service going into 
the physical production process. 
to adopt the typical share lease of the areas. As men-
tioned previously, these figures have been computed 
on the basis of all farms in the sample so that the 
" average product" met hod of imputing incomes 
might be compared with the "marginal product" 
method. It is the comparison of sharing methods, 
applied to actual farm situations, which is important, 
rather than a comparison between tenure groups.21 
The tenant's share of the expenses or resonrce ser-
vices is 54.3 percent of the total annual input for 
northern Iowa, It is 67.7 percent for southern Iowa.22 
01 This procedure was foilowed since significant elasticity 
coefficients were not obtained for the sample of share-rented 
farms in southern Iowa and because economic equilibrium caus-
ing market prices of resources and marginal value product of 
resources to approach each other relates to all farms, rather 
than rented farms alone. 
.. 'Vlth slight exceptions due to "weighting of input items," 
these proportions are nearly Identical with those dc:riv:ed for th,e 
samples of share-rented farms in the two areas, Tins IS an obVI-
ous fact since the shares of product and expenses on the share-
rented farms were used in computing those tor "all farm 
samples," 
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This difference arises mainly because the contribution 
of the land input is relatively smaller in southern 
than in northern Iowa. The landlord not only fur-
nishes fewer acres per farm for crop production, but 
each acre also has a lower physical productivity and 
makes a smaller value contribution to total farm 
production. Even if the value contribution of crop 
and pasture land is totaled for southern Iowa, the 
sum is less than the value contribution of cropland 
alone in northern Iowa. 
In view of these differences, it appears doubtful if 
sharing arrangements should be as similar for the 
two areas as is shown in table 6. Or, if similar arrange-
ments are to be used for inputs or expenses, it per-
haps is economically unrealistic that the shares of 
crops should be as homogeneous as shown in table 6. 
"AVERAGE PRODUCT" METHOD OF IMPUTING SHARES 
Table 7 shows that the share of crop income going 
to tenant and landlord is quite similar to the share 
of resource services provided by each. The tenant 
receives 53 percent of the crop income and furnishes 
54.3 percent of the crop expenses. However, the two 
shares are considerably different in southern Iowa. 
'rhe tenant receives 53 percent of crop income but 
furnishes 67.7 percent of crop services. 
The data in table 7 provide the basis for allocating 
shares to landlord and tenant on the "average prod-
uct" basis. If the "average product" method of im-
puting income is considered, the rental share in 
northern Iowa is "in line," considering the variance 
of the data, with the value of resource services fur-
nished by each party. This is not true for southern 
Iowa. Some adjustment in shares of product or ex-
pense would need to be made if the "average prod-
uct" method of sharing were the actual goal. How-
ever, there are reasons why shares and produets 
need not correspond in a particular area. 
The proportions of resources furnished and the 
shares of products reeeived by tenants and landlords 
would need to be equal only if the" average product" 
method of allocating shares were the single :force 
entering into rental prices. However, the "average 
product" method is mainl~T an empirical device 
whereby tenant and landlord might obtain an over-
all picture of their business structure and sharing 
arrangements. 
Other economic forces of the market also effect 
rental rates or prices. One of these forces is the supply 
of labor relative to the demand for it. It is known 
that the size of the farm popUlation and the working 
force relative to the cropland area in southern Iowa 
are greater than for northern Iowa. This relatively 
greater supply of the labor resource acts to bid up 
the rental share or prices. Higher rental rates, which 
leave a smaller residual for labor return, may cause 
some of the surplus of labor to move into nonfarm 
industries where its productivity is greater than in 
farming'. To the extent that this facet of economic 
organization is expressed in the higher shares of 
product relative to inputs in southern Iowa, the dif-
ferentials between southern and northern Iowa need 
not have negative connotations. Differentials in rental 
and expense ratios simply act to bring the supply of 
rABLE 8. RESOURCE SHARES AND PROPORTIONS OF PRODUCTIVITY VALUES REPRESENTED BY TENANT AND LAND-
LORD RESOURCES WHEN SHARES IMPUTED TO RESOURCES ARE BASED ON MEAN MARGINAL PRODUCTS. 
Tenant Landlord Total farm 
Units X Units X Units X 
Marginal marginal Marginal marginal marginal 
product product product product product 
Resource Units ($) ($)' Units ($) ($)t ($) 
Northern Iowa (1961 sample) 
Cropland xx Labor ________ 9.5 
Capital 
------
2,168 
Total 
--------
xx 
Percent of farm 
total xx 
Croplaml xX 
Labor ________ 8.7 
Capital 
------
1,421 
Total 
---------
xx 
Percent of farm 
total xx 
.Column 1 multiplied by column 2. 
tColumn 4 multiplied by column 5. 
xx xx 
68.04 651. 78 
0.65 1,409.20 
xx 2,060.98 
xx 24.6 
Southern Iowa 
xx xx 
48.05 418.03 
1.32 1,875.72 
xx 2,293.75 
xx 36.3 
labor, capital and land resources into line with each 
other and to cause them to be used for the products 
which consumers desire. 
If the higher rent~l shares in southern Iowa result 
because of the relative surplus of labor, higher rental 
rates which cause more of this labor to move to other 
localities or to other industries are consistent with 
the best use of resources. 
SHARES OF CROPS IN PHOPORTION TO MARGINAL PRODUCTS 
The "modified marginal products" method is used 
in table 8 as a basis for calculating shares of income. 
If crop production were to be sharcd in proportion to 
the marginal products of landlord and tenant re-
sources, the share would be 75.4 percent to the land-
lord in northern Iowa and 63.7 percent in southern 
Iowa. These proportions result if the marginal pro-
ductivity of each resource (at its mean) is multi-
plied by the mean quantity of the resource and the 
sums are calculated in the manner outlined earlier. 
The "sum of the productivities" is $10,006 in 
northern Iowa (table 8), while the actual value of 
crop production is only $8,551 (table 7). The respec-
tive figures are $6,314 and $4,777 in southern Iowa. 
The" sum of prodnctivities" exceeds the actual prod-
uct because the total elasticity is greater than 1 for 
the production function equation of both areas. (The 
sum of the elasticities or exponents for crop produc-
tion in northern Iowa is 0.076 + 0.912 + 0.165 = 
1.153. The sum is 0.088 + 0.795 + 0.393' = 1.176 
for southern Iowa.) Hence, an inequality of the 
nature outlined at the beginning of this section exists. 
'1'he largest proportion of income is imputed (under 
the "modified marginal product method") to the 
landlord's resource because the elasticity cocfficient 
of land is so high. That is, the marginal productivity 
of land does not decline by relatively large amounts 
up to the mean,23 In contrast, the marginal produc-
2. All marginal productivities in this study are calCUlated at 
the mean input of resources (see footnote 15). 
167 46.83 7,820.61 7,820.61 
xx xx xx 651. 78 
278 0.65 180.70 1,589.90 
xx xx 8,001.31 10,062.29 
xx xx 75.4 100 
(1951 sample) 
115 33.08 3,804.20 3,804.20 
xx xx xx 418.03 
164 1.32 216.48 2,092.20 
xx xx 3,020.68 6.314.43 
xx xx 63.7 100 
tivity for labor declines rapidly because the elasticity 
coefficient is only 0.076 for northern Iowa and 0.088 
for southern Iowa. Elasticity coefficients arc much 
lower for capital services than for land in both areas.24 
The imputational shares computed under the 
"modified marginal product" method are vastly dif-
ferent from shares established under existing leasing 
customs. '1'herefore, it is doubtful that the method: 
(1) can be applied effectively, (2) would be accept-
ablc as a basis for allocating the total farm prod-
uct or (3) has close relationship to the relative mar-
ket demand for various resources. However, while it 
does not appear to be a. useful or feasible method of 
allocating shares to tenant and langlord, the "mar-
ginal product" method has onc thing in common with 
the "average product" method. Both methods indi-
cate a greater share of the total farm product for the 
tenant in southern Iowa than in northern Iowa. 
Under existing arrangements, the actual share to the 
tenant is lower in southern than in northern Iowa. 
If the "average product." method werc used, the 
southern Iowa tenant would get 67.7 percent of the 
crop incomc, and the northern Iowa tenant would get 
54.3 percent. If the "modified marginal product" 
method were used, the shares to the tenant would be 
36.3 percent in southern and 24.6 in northern Iowa. 
LIMITATION OF MARGINAL PRODUCTIVITY 
ANALYSIS IN IMPUTING SHARES 
The marginal productivity analysis applied in this 
study has limitations mainly of three kinds. One kind 
•• If each unit of resource were allocated Its own marginal 
product (rather than the marginal product of the mean resource 
unit), the proportion of the "sum of productlvltles" going to 
tenant resources would be greater. This Is true because the 
"first" units of tenant resources (I.e., labor and the largest part 
of the capital) have a much higher productivity than the "mean" 
unit. I .. and does not have a similarly high marginal product for 
the "first" units as compared to the "mean" units. However, 
computation of all of the quantities would require an enormous 
quantity of time and resources. The magnitude of the marginal 
product of one unit of one resource will differ depending on all 
other possible quantities of the remaining resources. 
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of limitation deals with problems in estimation of 
coefficients and need not be explained here.25 
The second limitation deals with the use of mar-
ginal productivity coefficients in imputing shares of 
total farm production to tenant and landlord. Few 
production function estimates are likely to give pro-
duction elasticities which total exactly 1. Thus, the 
"marginal product" method will always give absolute 
shares for tenant and landlord which total more than 
the actual product. There is no basis for specifying 
that this "surplns" or "deficit" should fall to the 
tenant alone, the landlord alone or that it should be 
shared in any particular way. However, landlords and 
tenants can and should use marginal approximations 
in their budgeting and planning. These marginal 
quantities can be estimated simply as expected addi-
tions to returns from additions to inputs or costs 
supplied by both parties. Considering additional re-
tUrns and costs, marginal shares can be calculated to 
show whether a new practice or resource input is 
profitable to both parties. The calculations also can 
•• For details of these limitations in estimatlon. see: Heady, 
Earl O. Productivity and income of labor and capital on Mar-
shall silt loam farms In relation to conservation farming. Iowa 
Agr. Exp. Sta. Res. Bu!. 401. 
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be used for changing shares to make new practices 
or inputs profitable. 
A final limitation of the study deals with aggre-
gation of inputs and stratification of samples. This 
study has been in terms of a single, broad category 
of capital services. For detailed analysis which may 
show how the productivity of particular forms of 
capital resources (i.e., fertilizer, machinery, conser-
vation materials. etc.) are affected by various leasing 
arrangements, samples are needed which allow much 
more detail in stratification. The over-all sample 
needs to be broken into strata such as: (a) :farms 
which do and those which do not share resource con-
tributions in the same proportion as production; (b) 
farms which do and those whieh do not use the same 
shares for different crops; (c) farms which do and 
those which do not have leases for various periods of 
time or which contain different provisions for com-
pensation; and (d) tenants who have similar amounts 
of capital or who are or are not related to the land-
lord. By stratifying farms on the basis of criteria 
such as these, greater differentials in productivity 
may be uncovered than in this study where farms 
operated under leases were simply grouped into broad 
strata by lease types. 
